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Abstract
The Note argues that the UK must modify its extrajudicial detention legislation in order to
comply with the prompt appearance requirement of Article 5(3) of the European Convention. It
analyzes the history of the conflict between Northern Ireland the the UK leading to the implemen-
tation of the extrajudicial powers of arrest and detention and the Court’s decision in the Case of
Brogan and Others. The Note further argues that the eventual permanent derogation which the UK
employs is untenable under the EC and recommends judicial reinterpretation.
THE UNITED KINGDOM'S OBLIGATION TO BALANCE
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS ANTI-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION: THE CASE OF BROGAN
AND OTHERS
[lff the State is subject to no limitations in its pursuit of terrorists,
then there is no place for human rights, for they are inevitably a limi-
tation; if the pursuit of terrorism justifies no different restriction of
human rights than the normal policing of society, then the problems of
terrorism will pose no questions under the Convention which will not
arise with respect to the ordinary criminal process.'
INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom is a signatory to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(the "European Convention").2 Article 5(3) of the European
Convention requires the prompt appearance of a detained in-
dividual before a judicial authority.3 The European Conven-
tion also permits a contracting party to derogate from the
prompt appearance requirement of article 5(3) in times of
emergency.4 The United Kingdom's anti-terrorism legislation,
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1989 (the "PTA" or the "Act"), permits extrajudicial arrest
and detention of suspected terrorists for as long as seven
days.' In the Case of Brogan and Others,6 the European Court of
Human Rights (the "Court") concluded that these extrajudi-
cial powers of arrest and detention are incompatible with the
prompt appearance requirement of article 5(3) of the Euro-
pean Convention.7
1. Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights and The Prevention of Terror-
ism, 32 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 82, 90 (1983) (citation omitted) [hereinafter The ECHR and
Terrorism].
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
3. Id. art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226. For the text of article 5(3) of the European
Convention, see infra note 26.
4. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
5. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 14(5), re-
printed in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1294 (4th ed. 1989).
For the text of section 14(5) of the Act, see infra note 134.
6. 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
7. Id. at 34.
328
THE CASE OF BROGAN AND OTHERS
This Note argues that the United Kingdom must modify
its extrajudicial detention legislation in order to comply with
the prompt appearance requirement of article 5(3) of the Eu-
ropean Convention. Part I discusses the European Convention
and highlights the sections applicable to this conflict. Part II
analyzes the history of the conflict between the United King-
dom and Northern Ireland leading to the implementation of
the extrajudicial powers of arrest and detention and the
Court's decision in the Case of Brogan and Others. Part III argues
that successive submissions of notices of derogation, which ef-
fectively result in. a form of permanent derogation, is untena-
ble under the European Convention and recommends the judi-
cial reinterpretation of the prompt appearance requirement of
article 5(3) of the European Convention and the amendment
of the PTA. This Note concludes that these measures will per-
mit the United Kingdom to comply with the prompt appear-
ance requirement of article 5(3) of the European Convention.
I. THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
A. Obligations of Contracting Parties
The Member States of the Council of Europe8 signed the
Convention on November 4, 1950. 9 Its goal is universal obser-
vance and collective enforcement of the fundamental human
rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights' ° by the "like-minded" governments of the European
countries that share a common heritage." Through the Euro-
pean Convention, the Council of Europe affirmed its profound
8. The current Members of The Council of Europe are Austria, Belgium, Cy-
prus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. J. FAWCETr, APPLICATION OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6 n.3 (2d ed. 1987).
9. European Convention, supra note 2, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222 n. 1. The European
Convention came into force on September 3, 1953. Id. The original signatories to
the European Convention were Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Saar, Sweden, Tur-
key, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 222.
10. G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. 1/777 (1948).
11. European Convention, supra note 2, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222-24. The European
Convention defined as "like-minded" those countries with common political tradi-
tions, ideals, freedoms, and rules of law. Id.
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belief in the role of fundamental freedoms as the foundation of
justice and peace in the world.' 2
The European Convention obligates the contracting par-
ties to ensure the compatibility of their domestic law with the
European Convention and to remedy any breach of the Euro-
pean Convention's provisions.1 3 At the time of signing or rati-
fication, a contracting party may, however, make a reservation
from a European Convention provision if a domestic law in
force at that time is not in conformity with that provision.' 4 At
present, fourteen signatories have incorporated the provisions
of the European Convention into their domestic law and seven
have not. ' 5
The enforcement procedures of the European Convention
enable the government of a contracting party to charge an-
other contracting party with a breach of European Convention
procedures before the Convention institutions. 16 Additionally,
an individual may allege a violation of the European Conven-
tion by a contracting party' 7 and may submit a petition to the
12. Id. at 222. The Council of Europe seeks greater unity among its members
through the maintenance of human rights and fundamental freedoms by effective
political democracy and a common understanding and observance of these rights. Id.
13. Id. arts. 1, 13, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224, 232; seeJ. FAWCETr, supra note 8, at 3.
14. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 64, 213 U.N.T.S. at 252. Article 64
of the Convention provides:
(1) Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing
its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular
provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its
territory is not in conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general
character shall not be permitted under this Article.
(2) Any reservation made under this Article shall contain a brief state-
ment of the law concerned.
Id.
15. J. FAWCETr, supra note 8, at 6 n.3. The following contracting parties have
incorporated the provisions of the European Convention into their domestic law,
completely or substantially in part: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey. Id.
The following contracting parties have not incorporated the provisions of the
European Convention into their domestic law: Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Malta,
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id.
16. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 24, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236. Enforce-
ment procedures available to contracting parties are found in article 24, which pro-
vides that "[a]ny High Contracting Party may refer to the Commission, through the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, any alleged breach of the provisions of
the Convention by another High Contracting Party." Id.
17. Id. art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38. Enforcement procedures for individual
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Convention institutions.' 8 In order for the Convention institu-
tions to have recourse against the accused contracting party,
the violation must have occurred within the jurisdiction of the
accused contracting party.' 9 Additionally, all domestic reme-
dies must be exhausted before the Convention institutions will
accept a petition.20 Finally, the accused contracting party must
have expressly accepted an individual's right to petition as well
as the jurisdiction of the Convention institutions.2 1 A con-
tracting party or individual complainant initially files a petition
with the European Commission of Human Rights (the "Com-
complaints are contained in article 25 of the European Convention, which provides
that
(1) The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental or-
ganization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by
one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Conven-
tion, provided that the High Contracting Party against which the complaint
has been lodged has declared that it recognizes the competence of the Com-
mission to receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting Parties
who have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any way the
effective exercise of this right.
(2) Such declarations may be made for a specific period.
(3) The declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe who shall transmit copies thereof to the High Con-
tracting Parties and publish them.
(4) The Commission shall only exercise the powers provided for in this
Article when at least six High Contracting Parties are bound by declarations
made in accordance with the preceding paragraphs.
Id.
18. Id. art. 28, 213 U.N.T.S. at 238-40. A petition is initially filed with the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights. Id. Article 28 of the European Convention de-
fines the Commission's role and provides that
[i]n the event of the Commission accepting a petition referred to it:
(a) it shall, with a view to ascertaining the facts, undertake together
with the representatives of the parties an examination of the petition and, if
need be, an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the States con-
cerned shall furnish all necessary facilities, after an exchange of views with
the Commission;
(b) it shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a
view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect
for Human Rights as defined in this Convention.
Id.
19. STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS By LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1977, Cmnd. No. 7009, at 36.
20. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 26, 213 U.N.T.S. at 238; see 504
PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 970 (1989); see alzoJ. FAWCETr, supra note 8, at 6.
21. STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BY LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1977, Cmd. No. 7009, at 36.
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mission") and the case may be referred to the Court within a
three month period.22
Violations of the European Convention may also be en-
forced in a contracting party's national court system if the ac-
cused contracting party has incorporated the European Con-
vention provisions into its domestic law.23 In the absence of
such incorporation, individuals cannot use a contracting
party's legal system to enforce directly the European Conven-
tion provisions. In such situations, there is no domestic route
open to test the compatibility of domestic laws with the Euro-
pean Convention provisions.2 4 Furthermore, without incorpo-
ration of the European Convention provisions into a con-
tracting party's domestic law, the courts of a contracting party
cannot function as sieves to the Convention institutions; the
Convention institutions are thus the only forum to address
complaints.25
B. Article 5 of the European Convention
Article 5 of the Convention protects the freedom and se-
curity of the individual against arbitrary detention or arrest. 26
22. European Convention, supra note 2, arts. 31, 32(1), 47, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240,
246. Articles 31, 32(1), 47 outline the referral process to the Court. Article 31 pro-
vides that if a friendly settlement is not reached between the parties as prescribed by
article 28, the Commission shall prepare a report of its opinion regarding the alleged
breach. Id. art. 31, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240. This report is to be transmitted to the
Committee of Ministers. Id. Article 32(1) requires that any referral to the Court be
made within three months from the date of the transmission of the Commission's
report to the Committee of Ministers. Id. art. 32(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 240. Article 47
further requires that the Court may deal with a case only after the Commission has
failed to effect a friendly settlement within the three month period provided in article
32. Id. art. 47, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246.
23. See id. art. 13, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232; see alsoJ. FAWCETr, supra note 8, at 6.
24. See generally J. FAWCETr, supra note 8, at 6 (discussing impact of incorporation
of Convention provisions on domestic enforcement procedures). If a state has ac-
cepted the right to individual petition pursuant to article 25, its domestic laws can be
tested for compatibility in the European Court of Human Rights or the Commission.
European Convention, supra note 2, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38. For the text of
article 25 of the European Convention, see supra note 17.
Furthermore, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to a detained individual in
the United Kingdom. Case of Brogan and Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 25
(1988). Habeas corpus permits a detained individual to submit to a U.K. court an ur-
gent application for his release on the basis that his detention is unlawful. Id.
25. See 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 970-71 (1989).
26. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226-28. Article 5
provides:
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The important questions that arise in relation to article 5 con-
cern the extent to which the powers of the contracting party to
detain are enhanced and the concomitant procedural duties re-
laxed when an arrested individual is a suspected terrorist.27
Article 5(1) enumerates permissible cases in which a state may
deprive an individual's liberty.28 The Court and the Commis-
sion have interpreted this provision narrowly when evaluating
a contracting party's justification for interference with an indi-
vidual's liberty.29 Furthermore, article 5(3) requires the
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent
court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with
the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obliga-
tion prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion
of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered neces-
sary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educa-
tional supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading
of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug ad-
dicts or vagrants;
() the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
(2) Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against
him.
(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be enti-
tled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release
may be conditioned by guarantees to appear to trial.
(4) Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention
shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention
is not lawful.
(5) Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contra-
vention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.
Id.
27. The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 110.
28. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226.
29. See, e.g., The Guzzardi Case, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980) (concluding
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prompt appearance of a detained individual before a judge or
other judicial authority.30 It is unclear, however, the extent to
which the existence of a terrorist threat within the contracting
party's jurisdiction will effect a relaxation of the article 5(3) re-
quirement of a prompt appearance.
3
'
Few cases have interpreted the boundaries of the prompt
appearance requirement set forth in article 5(3) of the Euro-
pean Convention. 32 The European Convention does not ex-
pressly articulate what constitutes an acceptable length of time
between arrest and appearance before a judicial authority
when extraordinary circumstances exist.3 3 The cases that in-
terpret the prompt appearance requirement indicate that some
delay is permitted under article 5(3).4 However, they do not
clearly establish what circumstances are exceptional and, thus,
justify a delay in bringing the accused before a judicial author-
ity.3 5
The enumerated justifications for the deprivation of an in-
dividual's liberty include arrest and detention effected for the
purpose of bringing the arrestee before the appropriate judi-
that article 5(1) forbids deprivation of liberty of detainee in order to prevent him
from committing a crime); see also The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 111.
30. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226. For the
text of article 5(3) of the Convention, see supra note 26.
31. The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 110-11.
32. See, e.g., Case of Dejong, Baijet and Van Den Brink, 77 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1984). In this case, the Court concluded that six, seven, and eleven day detention
periods without judicial intervention were incompatible with the prompt appearance
requirement of article 5(3). Id. at 25. The Court explained that "[i]n the particular
circumstances, even taking due account of the exigencies of military life and military
justice ... the Court considers that the intervals in question cannot be regarded as
consistent with the required 'promptness.' "Id.; see X v. Belgium, 42 Collections of Deci-
sions of The European Commission of Human Rights (Eur. Comm'n H.R.) 55 (1973), Appli-
cation No. 4960/71 (concluding five day detention without judicial review compatible
with prompt appearance requirement of article 5(3) under extraordinary circum-
stance of applicant's hospitalization during his detention); X v. The Netherlands,
1966 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON HUM. RTs. (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 564, Application
No. 2894/66 (concluding four days satisfied prompt appearance requirement of arti-
cle 5(3)).
33. The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 11. The need to establish reason-
able suspicion against the detained individual is not an acceptable cause for delay;
reasonable suspicion should exist prior to the arrest. Id.
34. See supra note 32 (discussing case law interpreting prompt appearance re-
quirement); The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 111. Any delay should relate to
the practical problems of getting a detained person before the proper judicial author-
ity. Id.
35. The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 11i.
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cial authority.36 Article 5(3), however, limits the duration of
such detentions with the requirement that the detainee
"promptly" appear before a judicial authority.37 The Conven-
tion institutions have traditionally interpreted narrowly the
provisions of article 5 in order to expand the protections of
liberty guaranteed by the European Convention. 38 The Con-
vention institutions, however, also recognize the need to inter-
pret the European Convention in light of changing conditions
in Europe, 39 including the significant increase in acts of terror-
ism. 4o
The Court has emphasized the need for the assessment of
promptness in light of the purpose of article 5.4 The Court
has pursued a semantic analysis of the term "promptly" and
concluded that only limited flexibility is permitted in its inter-
pretation.42 Furthermore, the special features of each case
must be considered in the assessment of whether a release is
prompt.43 The significance attached to the special features of a
case, however, cannot negate the state's obligation, pursuant
to article 5(3), to ensure a prompt appearance. 44
C. Derogation Under the European Convention
The European Convention provides a solution to the di-
lemma encountered by a state when circumstances within its
borders constitute a threat to its national security and compli-
36. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(1)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226. For
the text of article 5(i)(c) of the Convention, see supra note 26.
37. Id. art. 5(3), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226; seeJ. FAWCETr, supra note 8, at 101. For
the text of article 5(3) of the Convention, see supra note 26.
38. See, e.g., The Guzzardi Case, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980) (concluding
article 5(1) forbids deprivation of liberty of detainee in order to prevent him from
committing crime); see Warbrick, The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1976 and the European Convention on Human Rights: The McVeigh Case, 32 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 757, 759 (1983) thereinafter Prevention of Terrorism].
39. Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 19 (1979); Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 15 (1978); see Prevention of Terrorism, supra note 38, at 758.
40. See, e.g., McVeigh, O'Neil and Evans v. The United Kingdom, 5 E.H.R.R. 71
(1981) (widening discretion given to states to take measures deviating from ordinary
process of law enforcement for purposes of combatting terrorism); see also Prevention
of Terrorism, supra note 38, at 757.
41. Case of Brogan and Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 32 (1988).
42. Id.; see infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing Brogan court's
semantic analysis of prompt).
43. Case of Brogan and Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 32 (1988).
44. Id. at 32-33.
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ance with the obligations of the European Convention under-
mine its sovereign duty to protect its citizenry.4 5 Article 15 of
the European Convention, the derogation clause, permits par-
tial or complete abrogation from the European Convention
rights in times of emergency.46 Accordingly, the Court has
concluded that the derogation clause affirms the principle that
a contracting party should be afforded additional deference to
combat threats to the security of its population.4 7 Derogation
from the requirement to protect the guaranteed rights of indi-
viduals is necessary because such crisis situations often involve
violence and the imminent breakdown of minimum order.48
45. See European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34;
Schreuer, Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency: The Experience of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 113, 113-15
(1982).
46. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34. Article
15 of the European Convention provides that
(1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
obligations under this convention to the extent strictly required by the exi-
gencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent
with its other obligations under international law.
(2) No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting
from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be
made under this provision.
(3) Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of deroga-
tion shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully in-
formed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall
also inform the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such
measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are
again being fully executed.
Id.; see Boyle, Human Rights and Political Resolution in Northern Ireland, 9 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 156, 159 (1982). Boyle has identified the following characteristics as de-
fining "emergency" for purposes of article 15:
(i) the emergency must be actual or imminent;
(ii) its effects must involve the whole nation;
(iii) the continuance of the organized life of the community must be
threatened; and
(iv) the crisis or danger must be exceptional in that the normal measures or
restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public
safety, health, and order, are plainly inadequate.
Id. (citation omitted).
47. See, e.g., Lawless Case, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961) (concluding deroga-
tion from prompt appearance requirement during periods of terrorist violence ac-
ceptable under article 15); see also infra note 56 (discussing Lawless);J. FAWCE-ir, supra
note 8, at 311; Schreuer, supra note 45, at 115.
48. See, e.g., Lawless Case, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961) (citing existence of
secret army utilizing violence in Republic of Ireland and operating outside the Re-
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Article 15 is limited in its endorsement of derogation.4 9 It
permits derogation only during a war or other public emer-
gency that threatens the existence of the nation. 50  A con-
tracting party that derogates must employ strategies narrowly
tailored to remedy the peculiar emergency situation.5' Fur-
thermore, derogating states are never permitted to deviate
from the European Convention guarantees prohibiting tor-
ture, slavery, and ex post facto laws.52
The European Convention also provides the contracting
parties with a discretionary "margin of appreciation ' 53 in de-
termining the necessity of emergency measures and the extent
of the derogation required by the particular situation. 54 Al-
most without exception, the Court has approved counter-ter-
rorism measures enacted by states as consistent with a state's
margin of appreciation. 55 The presence of terrorist activities
public of Ireland, alarming increase in terrorist activities, and terrorist activities jeop-
ardizing Republic of Ireland's foreign relations as factors supporting derogation
under article 15); see also infra note 56 (discussing Lawless);J. FAWCETr, supra note 8, at
308; Schreuer, supra note 45, at 113.
49. See European Convention, supra note 2, art. 18, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234; J.
FAWCE-r, supra note 8, at 311; Schreuer, supra note 45, at 116.
50. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34. Pre-
cisely, article 15(1) permits derogation only in the case of "a war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation." Id. at 232.
51. Id. at 232-34; see Schreuer, supra note 45, at 116. Schreuer explains that
"[d]erogations must be applied subject to strict proportionality. This means: [(a)]
that the derogation should only apply to those rights which have to be limited to cope
with the emergency; and (b) that the limitation should only apply to the extent abso-
lutely required." Id.
52. European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34; see
Boyle, supra note 46, at 159. Boyle summarizes article 15(2) of the European Con-
vention as follows: "article 3 (prohibition on torture), article 4 (forced labor), article
7 (retroactive penal law), article 14 (discrimination), and article 2 (the right to life
except 'in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war') may not be derogated
from in any circumstances." Id.
53. See 1958-59 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.)
174, 176, Application No. 176/56 (introducing concept of margin of appreciation
regarding contracting party's discretion to assess necessity and measures of deroga-
tion); The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 99. The term "margin of apprecia-
tion" describes the discretion given to state parties under the European Convention
to determine the necessity and extent of measures of derogation. Id.
54. See The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 99.
55. See, e.g., Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)
(holding derogations from article 5 during periods of terrorist violence acceptable
under article 15); Lawless Case, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961) (concluding deroga-
tion from prompt appearance requirement during periods of terrorist violence ac-
ceptable under article 15); see also The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 115. The
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can amount to an emergency sufficient to justify an otherwise
unlawful deviation from European Convention provisions.56
Governments assert a right to derogate from human rights
obligations during times of national emergency in order to
safeguard the community interest.57 The right to derogate is a
factor in the reconciliation of individual liberties with commu-
nity interests during emergencies. 58 Detrimental effects on so-
ciety would result if governments were forced to protect fully
individual rights during violent public emergencies.59 The
proclamation of a public emergency, however, does not convey
an absolute right to suspend European Convention obliga-
tions.60 There must be a safeguard against manipulation of
community interests as an excuse for human rights viola-
tions.6' Accordingly, the Commission and the Court have ju-
risdictional power to review the entitlement of a state to dero-
gate from European Convention provisions and, ifjustified, to
determine whether the derogation is in conformity with the ex-
exception appears in the Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 41-43. For a discussion of the Greek Case, see infra note 65.
56. See, e.g., Lawless Case, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961) (citing existence of
secret army utilizing violence in Republic of Ireland and operating outside the Re-
public of Ireland, alarming increase in terrorist activities, and terrorist activities jeop-
ardizing Republic of Ireland's foreign relations as factors supporting derogation
under article 15); see also The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 115. Terrorist
activities breach the human rights of their victims. Id. at 93. Therefore, the individu-
als who interfere with the human rights of others render themselves susceptible to
the loss of their own human rights. Id. Consistent with this view is the Lawless Case.
In Lawless, an Irish citizen accused the Republic of Ireland with, among other things,
violations of article 5 of the European Convention. 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 30-31
(1961). The allegations in Lawless stemmed from a five-month detention, authorized
by the Republic of Ireland and predicated upon the suspicion of involvement in ter-
rorist activities. Id. The Court relied upon the exigencies of terrorism in the Repub-
lic of Ireland in its evaluation of the detention laws at issue and concluded that the
terrorist threat was sufficient to justify derogation from article 5(3). Id. at 56. The
Court concluded that the five-month detention period was compatible with the Re-
public of Ireland's derogation. Id. at 62. The Court dismissed the article 5 charges,
thereby sanctioning extended detention periods for suspected terrorists in derogat-
ing countries. See id.
57. Schreuer, supra note 45, at 113.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Schreuer notes that "[human rights violations] are typically made to fa-
cilitate the task of power elites in ruling a community or, worse, to further their spe-
cial interests." Id.
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igencies of the particular situation.62 The United Kingdom,63
Ireland,64 Greece,65 and Turkey66 have invoked the derogation
62. Lawless Case, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 55 (1961); see Boyle, supra note 46,
at 159. In Lawless, the Court stated that
any High Contracting Party has the right, in case of war or public emergency
threatening the life of the nation, to take measures derogating from its obli-
gations under the Convention . . . provided that such measures are strictly
limited to what is required by the exigencies of the situation ... [. I]t is for
the Court to determine whether the conditions laid down in Article 15 for
the exercise of the exceptional right of derogation have been fulfilled in the
present case.
3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 55 (1961).
63. See 1966 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 16-20; 1965 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUM. RTS. 10-16; 1964 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 28-30; 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONY.
ON HUM. RTS. 44-54; 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTS. 74-90; 1958-1959 Y.B.
EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 84-86; 1955-1957 EUR. COMM'N HUM. RTS., DOCUMENTS &
DECISIONS 48-51. These notices of derogation concern measures of administrative
detention in the United Kingdom's overseas territories prior to 1966. Schreuer, supra
note 45, at 117. These territories have subsequently gained their independence from
the United Kingdom, and, accordingly, the European Convention no longer applies
to them. Id.
The United Kingdom has also freely exercised its right to derogate from the
European Convention as concerns special powers of arrest and detention in North-
ern Ireland. See 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 22; 1975 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUM. RTS. 18; 1973 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 24-8; 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUM. RTS. 32. The United Kingdom gave notice of derogation on August 20, 1971
on the basis of
acts of terrorism, including murders, attempted murders, maimings, bomb-
ings, fire-raising and acts of intimidation, and more recently violent civil dis-
turbances. The Government of Northern Ireland has therefore found it
necessary ... for the protection of life and the security of property and to
prevent outbreaks of public disorder, to exercise, to the extent strictly re-
quired by the exigencies of the situation, powers of detention and intern-
ment.
Id.
The United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe first
submitted notice of derogation regarding Northern Ireland to the Secretary General
of the Council in 1957. See 1955-1957 EUR. COMM'N HUM. RTS., DOCUMENTS & DECI-
SIONS 50. The United Kingdom renewed this notice of derogation several times. See
1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 22; 1975 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 18;
1973 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 24-8; 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 32;
1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 72-74. The United Kingdom completely with-
drew all notices of derogation regarding Northern Ireland on August 22, 1984. 21
INFO. BULL. LEGAL ACTIVITIES WITHIN COUNCIL OF EUROPE & MEMBER STATES 2 (July
1985).
64. See 1977 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 28-30; 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON
HUM. RTS. 20-24; 1955-1957 EUR. COMM'N HUM. RTS., DOCUMENTS & DECISIONS 47-
48 (concerning measures of administrative detention).
65. See 1967 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 26-36. This document gave notice
of the suspension of an extensive list of articles of the Greek Constitution in 1967.
Id. Subsequent communications with the Commission detailed the necessity of the
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clause of the European Convention during times of national
crisis.
II. THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT, THE
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY
PROVISIONS) ACT 1974, AND THE CASE
OF BROGAN AND OTHERS
A. History of the Northern Ireland Conflict
Protestant rule of Ireland by what is now the United King-
dom was confirmed in July 1690 when the Protestant Prince
William of Orange defeated the army of the deposed Catholic
monarch James 11.67 Fighting between Protestants and
Catholics has dominated the subsequent centuries of Irish his-
tory. 6 8 The U.K. Parliament ultimately agreed to Irish home-
derogation. Id. at 38-44. The Commission found the notices incomplete and re-
jected the notices of derogation. See Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM.
RTS. 41-43. In the Greek Case, the Commission concluded that
the respondent Government hald] not fully met the requirements of Article
15, paragraph (3), of the Convention, in that:
(1) it did not communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Eu-
rope the texts of a number of legislative measures and in particular that of
the new Constitution of 1968;
(2) it did not provide the Secretary General with full information of the ad-
ministrative measures, in particular as regards the detention of persons
without court order;
(3) it did not communicate to the Secretary General the reasons for the
measures of derogation until 19th September, 1967, that is to say more than
four months after they were first taken.
Id. at 42-43.
66. 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 26-30; 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM.
RTS. 20; 1975 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 8-16; 1974 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM.
RTS. 24-28; 1973 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 16-24; 1972 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUM. RTS. 16-22; 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 24-32; 1970 Y.B. EUR. CONV.
ON HUM. RTS. 18-22; 1964 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTS. 22-26; 1961 Y.B. EUR.
CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 54-62. These notices are the most extensive derogations sub-
mitted to the Commission and as such have been criticized as vague and incompatible
with the notice requirements of article 15. Schreuer, supra note 45, at 118. Schreuer
criticized the notices of derogation, stating, "[t]he reasons given for the steps are not
compelling and, more important, the extent of the derogations is unspecified. The
notices simply refer to states of emergency, siege, or martial law." Id.
67. Hellerstein, McKay, & Schlam, Criminal justice And Human Rights In Northern
Ireland, 43 REC. A.B. CIT N.Y. 110, 116 (1988) [hereinafter Hellerstein]; see T.
BALDY, BATrLE FOR ULSTER 33-44 (1987) (presenting historical overview of English-
Irish conflict dating to 1171); see also R. FOSTER, MODERN IRELAND: 1600-1972 494-
511 (1988); T. INGRAM, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF IRISH HISTORY (1900).
68. Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 116-17.
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rule in 1920.69 The Ulster Protestants of the northern six
counties, however, had insisted on special treatment in the
home-rule legislation. 70 The southern twenty-six counties ad-
hered to their goal of a unified Ireland and refused to accept
the partition of Ireland and two separate home-rule parlia-
ments. 7 1 In return for the acknowledgment by the U.K. Parlia-
ment of an Irish Free State, however, the southern twenty-six
counties agreed to the partition of Ireland; thus the alignment
of the six northern counties of Ireland with the United King-
dom was established.72 The Treaty of 192 17 and subsequent
U.K. legislation created the Irish Free State, a self-governing
political system. 7 4 The six northern counties retained an au-
tonomous government, and the region is now known as North-
ern Ireland. 75 In 1937, the remaining twenty-six counties of
the Irish Free State enacted a new constitution that proclaimed
the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Ire-
land.76
A deep and long-standing antagonism between the Protes-
tant and Catholic communities divides Northern Ireland.77
The Protestant sector, representing a two-to-one majority of
69. Id. at 117. Home-rule was the endorsement of self-governing status within
the British Commonwealth by the U.K. Parliament. See Case of Ireland v. The United
Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 10 (1978).
70. Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 117.
71. Id.; see R. FOSTER, supra note 67, at 494-511.
72. Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 117; R. FOSTER, supra note 67, at 494-511.
73. Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland, Dec. 6, 1921, Great Britain-Ire-
land, 114 B.S.P. 161 (Cmd. 1560), 26 L.N.T.S. 10.
74. See Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 10
(1978); see also T. BALDY, supra note 67, at 43. Baldy states that the Treaty of 1921
"established dominion status for the overwhelmingly Catholic southern twenty-six
counties, while Protestants in the north vetoed a united Ireland, choosing to retain
their link to Britain in a six-county partition that gave them a 2 to 1 majority over
Catholics." Id.; see id. at 119 n.67; Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 117.
75. Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 10
(1978); see T. BALDY, supra note 67, at 43; Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 117. One
commentator describes the Northern Ireland Parliament's rule as
sectarian and replete with anti-Catholic discrimination in employment,
housing, education and the franchise. In the absence of a written Constitu-
tion or meaningful judicial review, the Northern Ireland Parliament en-
larged already built-in Protestant electoral majorities with property qualifi-
cations and gerrymandering of election districts.
Id. at 117-18.
76. Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 10
(1978).
77. Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 114-15; Boyle, supra note 46, at 156.
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the population in general, vehemently opposes a unified Ire-
land and supports continued allegiance to the United King-
dom. 78  Conversely, the Catholic minority, in the main, sup-
ports a complete break from U.K. rule.79 The complex conflict
of identities and nationalisms in Northern Ireland has caused
political, social, and economic discrimination of the Catholic
minority.80
The current conflict in Northern Ireland, which began in
1968, has led to the re-emergence of the Irish Republican
Army (the "IRA"), the emergence of the Provisional IRA, and
the intervention of the U.K. army in Northern Ireland.8 The
IRA, a clandestine and quasi-military organization, does not
accept the alignment of Northern Ireland with the United
Kingdom and actively seeks what it views as liberation of the
Irish people from U.K. rule.82 The IRA promotes a unified
Ireland and seeks to drive the United Kingdom out of North-
78. Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 10-11
(1978); see T. BALDY, supra note 67, at 43.
79. Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 11
(1978).
80. Boyle, supra note 46, at 156; see T. BALDY, supra note 67, at 44-46 (discussing
discrimination of Catholics in Northern Ireland).
81. See Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur.' Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 11
(1978) (discussing formation of IRA in early twentieth century and inactivity of IRA
between 1962 and 1969); Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 121; see also T. BALDY, supra
note 67, at 49-53 (discussing IRA and emergence of Provisional IRA in 1970s). One
commentator explains that
[t]he current bout of terrorist intimidation and violence dates from 1968,
although it began more peacefully as a civil rights movement of the Catholic
minority modeled on the American experience earlier in that decade. Be-
ginning in October 1968, civil rights marchers encountered violent opposi-
tion from unionist mobs. Civil strife led to the intervention of the British
Army. While some Catholic protestors originally welcomed the presence of
the army as protection against the unionist attack, its presence soon stimu-
lated support for the IRA and the subsequent formation of the violent fac-
tion, the Provisional IRA.
Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 120-21.
82. Connelly, Political Violence and International Law: The Case of Northern Ireland,
16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 79 (1987); Cullen, Northern Ireland/20 Years Later, Boston
Globe, May 31, 1989, at 1; see Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 11 (1978); Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 118-19 (discussing Irish
political parties formed during twentieth century). See generally J. BELL, THE SECRET
ARMY (1970) (discussing Irish Republican Army). The Provisional IRA, which
formed in December 1969, is the armed offshoot of the IRA. T. BALDY, supra note 67,
at 50.
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ern Ireland.8 3 The IRA employs violence as a method of secur-
ing its goals and has periodically mounted terrorist campaigns
both in Ireland and in the United Kingdom. 84 The Protestant
loyalists have organized paramilitary groups that also use vio-
lence in order to preserve Northern Ireland's link with the
United Kingdom. 5
The early 1970s witnessed a dramatic increase in terrorist
violence stemming from the Northern Ireland conflict.86 The
United Kingdom responded by utilizing legislation granting
special powers of internment without trial in the cases of sus-
pected terrorists. 8 7 The violence continued to escalate, and, in
1972, the U.K. Army killed thirteen Catholic demonstrators in
Londonderry on the infamous "Bloody Sunday."'88  The un-
precedented rise in terrorist-related deaths and civil unrest in
Northern Ireland led the United Kingdom to resume direct
rule of that region.8 9 Additionally, the United Kingdom placed
executive authority over Northern Ireland in the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland.90
B. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
In 1974, the U.K. Parliament passed The Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. 9" The U.K. Par-
83. Tension Heightened over Protestants' Parade; IRA Bombing Precedes Ulster March,
L.A. Times, Aug. 13, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
84. Case of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 11
(1978); Connelly, supra note 82, at 79 n.l.
85. Connelly, supra note 82, at 79 n.i. The Ulster Defence Association, Ulster
Volunteer Force, and Ulster Freedom Force are the Protestant loyalist counterparts
to the Catholic republican paramilitary groups. T. BALDY, supra note 67, at 49. The
official Northern Ireland security forces, the Ulster Defense Regiment and the Royal
Ulster Constabulary, are predominantly comprised of Protestants. K. BOYLE & T.
HADDEN, IRELAND: A POSITIVE PROPOSAL 26 (1985).
86. See Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 121; see also Case of Ireland v. The United
Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 11 (1978).
87. See Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 120-21 (citing Civil Authorities (Special
Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922).
88. Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 121. The city of Londonderry has a Catholic
majority that calls the city Derry. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 85, at 17.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, PUBLIC
GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1974 (pt. II), ch. 56.
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liament subsequently amended the PTA in 1976,92 1984, 93 and
1989. 94 In enacting the PTA, the United Kingdom recognized
and sought to curtail the IRA terrorist campaigns that peaked
in 1974. 95
The PTA is part of the United Kingdom's legislative re-
sponse to the violence and havoc wrought on Northern Ireland
by the escalating terrorist activities. 96 There are three signifi-
cant sections of the PTA: part I prohibits membership in the
IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army,97 part II autho-
rizes exclusion of suspected terrorists from the United King-
dom at the discretion of the Secretary of State,98 and part IV
rests extrajudicial powers to arrest and detain persons sus-
pected of involvement in terrorist activities with the executive
authorities. 99
Section 12 of the 1984 version of the PTA, in force at the
time of the Brogan violations, authorizes the detention of sus-
pected terrorists for an initial period of forty-eight hours.' 00
92. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, PUBLIC
GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1976 (pt. I), ch. 8.
93. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, PUBLIC
GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1984 (pt. I), ch. 8.
94. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, reprinted in
12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279 (4th ed. 1989).
95. See I PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 337 (1981); Hellerstein, supra note 67, at
131. Two crowded public houses in Birmingham, England were bombed on Novem-
ber 21, 1974. Toolis, When BritishJustice Failed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 36. One of the bombs exploded in the basement bar of an office building
and killed twenty-one people and injured 162 people. Id. These bombings
prompted the U.K. Parliament to introduce the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1974. 1 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 337 (1981); see Hellerstein, supra
note 67, at 131.
96. See Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 131. The Nothern Ireland (Emergency Pro-
visions) Act 1978, which was amended in 1987, is another part of the U.K. anti-ter-
rorism legislation that permits arrest upon reasonable suspicion of the commission of
a scheduled offense. PUBLIC GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1987 (pt. II), ch. 30; see
Hellerstein, supra note 67, at 129-30.
97. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, pt. I, re-
printed in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1280 (4th ed. 1989).
The Irish National Liberation Army is a radical republican paramilitary organization
with a Marxist ideology that formed in 1975 after a violent split from the IRA. T.
BALDY, supra note 67, at 62.
98. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, pt. II, re-
printed in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1284 (4th ed. 1989).
99. Id. pt. IV, reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279,
1294 (4th ed. 1989).
100. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, § 12, PUB-
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In addition, it permits a full seven-day detention period with
the approval of the Secretary of State.10 ' Thus, the PTA con-
fers tremendous power in the executive for the prevention of
terrorism.10 2 There is no requirement that charges be levied
officially against the detained individual or that the detainee be
brought before a judicial authority."0 3
The U.K. Parliament, in the 1984 version of the PTA,
LIC GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1984 (pt. I), ch. 8, § 12, at 34-35. Section 12,
Powers of Arrest and Detention, provides as follows:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, a constable may arrest without war-
rant a person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be-
(a) a person guilty of an offence under section 1, 9 or 10 above;
(b) a person who is or has been concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which this Part of this
Act applies;
(c) a person subject to an exclusion order.
(2) The power'of arrest conferred by subsection (l)(c) above is exercisa-
ble only-
(a) in Great Britain, if the exclusion order was made under section
4 above; and
(b) in Northern Ireland, if it was made under section 5 above.
(3) The acts of terrorism to which this Part of this Act applies are-
(a) acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland;
and
(b) acts of terrorism of any description except acts connected
solely with the affairs of the United Kingdom or any part of the United
Kingdom other than Northern Ireland.
(4) A person arrested under this section shall not be detained in right
of the arrest for more than forty-eight hours after his arrest; but the Secre-
tary of State may, in any particular case, extend the period of forty-eight
hours by a period or periods specified by him.
(5) Any such further period or periods shall not exceed five days in all.
(6) The following provisions (requirement to bring accused person
before the court after his arrest) shall not apply to a person detained in right
of the arrest-
(a) section 43 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980;
(b) section 29 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969;
(c) (applies to Scotland only);
(d) Article 131 of the Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Or-
der 1981; and
(e) section 50(3) of the Children and Young Persons Act (North-
ern Ireland) 1968.
(7) (Applies to Scotland only.)
(8) The provisions of this section are without prejudice to any power of
arrest exercisable apart from this section.
Id.
101. Id. § 12(4)-(5).
102. See id.
103. See id. § 12(4) (vesting power to extend detentions with Secretary of State).
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mandated annual review of the PTA by independent investiga-
tors and gave the PTA a limited life-span of five years without
the possibility of renewal. 0 4 Some government ministers had
criticized the earlier reviews of the PTA as piecemeal and pro-
cedural.'0 5 They further suggested that the government more
adequately justify the special legislation for renewal and
warned against routine renewals. 10 6
C. The Case of Brogan and Others
The European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Bro-
gan and Others 107 concluded that the extrajudicial powers of
arrest and detention embodied in the PTA are incompatible
with the European Convention. 0 8 In Brogan, police officers,
pursuant to section 12 of the PTA, arrested the four applicants
at their respective homes in Northern Ireland.'0 9 The police
detained the four applicants for periods ranging from four
days and six hours to six days and sixteen and one-half
hours. 110 The applicants, as a result of these detentions,
presented applications to the Commission between October
18, 1984 and February 8, 1985, each alleging that the deten-
tions violated the prompt appearance requirement of article
5(3) of the European Convention."'
The Commission decision" 12 stated that an article 5(3) vio-
lation had occurred with respect to Brogan's detention (five
days and eleven hours) and Coyle's detention (six days and six-
teen and one-half hours) but not with respect to the detention
104. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, § 17(3),
General Note, PUBLIC GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1984 (pt. I), ch. 8, § 17(3), at
38.
105. See, e.g., 1 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 349, 353 (1981) (discussing need for
comprehensive inquiries into workings of PTA and inadequate reviews of PTA); see
also The ECHR and Terrorism, supra note 1, at 100-01.
106. 1 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 349 (1981); see The ECHR and Terrorism, supra
note 1, at 100-01.
107. 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
108. Id. at 34.
109. Id. at 19-21.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 26. The applicants also alleged violations of articles 5(1), (3)-(5), and
13. Id. Additionally, in the original petitions to the Commission, the applicants in
the Brogan case had alleged violations of article 5(2). Id. The applicants subse-
quently withdrew this claim; neither the Commission nor the Court considered it. Id.
112. 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 57 (1988) (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
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of the other two men who were detained for shorter periods.' 1 3
The Commission cited case law permitting detention periods
of four days in ordinary criminal offenses and five days in ex-
ceptional cases as compatible with the prompt appearance re-
quirement of article 5(3) of the European Convention." 4
The Court overruled the Commission decision and held
that all four detention periods violated the prompt appearance
requirement of article 5(3) of the European Convention." 5
The Court reasoned that attaching sufficient importance to the
special features of terrorism in order to justify so lengthy a pe-
riod of detention without judicial review would be an unac-
ceptably broad interpretation of the plain meaning of the word
"promptly."" ' 6 The Court feared that such an application
would seriously weaken the procedural protections that article
5(3) guaranteed to an individual's liberty."t 7
In its review of the Commission decision, the Court noted
that ordinary criminal law in Northern Ireland did not confer
power to arrest and detain a person merely to make inquiries
of him." 8 The Court explained, however, that it is permissible
to arrest individuals to dispel or confirm a reasonable suspi-
cion that they have committed an offense, provided that they
113. Id. at 63. The Commission stated that it
ha[d] assessed these periods against the background of its case-law accord-
ing to which a person should not be detained in normal cases for more than
four days without being brought before a judicial authority. The Commis-
sion is aware, however, that it must strike a fair balance between the inter
ests of the individual and the general interest of the community. In so do-
ing, the Commission takes into account that the struggle against terrorism
may require a particular measure of sacrifice by each citizen in order to pro-
tect the community as a whole against such crimes. Moreover, the Commis-
sion also bears in mind the context in which the applicants were arrested
and the reality of problems presented by the arrest and detention of sus-
pected terrorists which have been alluded to by the Government and which
may not be present in ordinary criminal cases.
Id. (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 62. The Commission noted that "in a case concerning ordinary crim-
inal offences it has found a period of four days to satisfy the requirement of prompt-
ness in Article 5 para. 3. In an exceptional case, where the applicant's state of health
required him to be hospitalized, a period of five days was considered acceptable." Id.
(citations omitted).
115. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 34 (1988).
116. Id. at 33-34.
117. Id. at.34.
118. Id. at 24.
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are brought before a court as soon as practicable." 9
The Court also noted the proliferation of terrorism in
modern society. 2 ' The Court recognized the need for a bal-
ance between the defense of democracy and the protection of
individual rights.' 2' The Court did not consider, however,
whether derogation by the United Kingdom under article 15 of
the European Convention would be justified on the basis of
terrorism in Northern Ireland. 22
In resolving the time limits of a prompt release, the Court
was confronted with two interpretations of the term prompt in
the European Convention. 23 The English text of the Euro-
pean Convention uses the term "promptly," while the French
text uses the more restrictive term "aussit6t," which literally
means immediately.'2 4 Treaty interpretation mandates that
the Court apply the two terms in a way that reconciles them as
much as possible but still adheres to the objectives of the Euro-
pean Convention. 25 The Court found the French term con-
trolling and, thus, concluded that only limited flexibility is per-
mitted in the interpretation of the time limits of prompt. 26
The Court noted that prolonged detention periods are ne-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 27.
121. Id. Furthermore, the applicants argued that there was no plausible reason
why the seven-day detention period permitted under the PTA was necessary, mark-
ing as it did such a radical departure from ordinary law, and even from the three-day
detention permitted under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978.
Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 30 (1988). The U.K. government countered
that the nature and extent of the terrorist threat, combined with the resulting
problems in obtaining evidence sufficient to bring charges, necessitated the maxi-
mum statutory seven-day detention period. Id. This power of detention, the govern-
ment argued, forms an indispensable part of the United Kingdom's effort to combat
the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland. Id.
The government further argued that the Secretary of State was the most suitable
official to authorize the extension of detention periods. Id. at 31. The Secretary of
State's specialized knowledge of the anti-terrorist activities and his unique ability to
maintain a consistent approach to extension procedures isolate him as the most via-
ble authority to oversee the extension process. See id. Furthermore, the acute sensi-
tivity of the information on which suspicion for arrest is based and the risks involved
in revealing it in court support the government's submission that extensions of de-
tention could not be judicially controlled. See id.
122. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 28 (1988).
123. Id. at 32.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
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cessitated by the terrorist activities in Northern Ireland and
that these detentions do not violate the prompt appearance re-
quirement of article 5(3) of the European Convention. t27
Although the difficulties of judicial control over decisions to
arrest and detain suspects could alter the manner in which arti-
cle 5(3) is implemented, the Court warned that these concomi-
tant exigencies could not dispense altogether with the require-
ment of a prompt appearance before a judicial authority. 28
The dissent objected to the majority's apparent departure
from prior case law.1 29 The dissent criticized the majority, not-
ing that it had failed to respect the limited discretion tradition-
ally left to the states and that it had ignored the maxim that the
acceptable period of detention will vary with the peculiar facts
of each case.13 0 Furthermore, the dissent supported its posi-
tion with case law stating that a limit for the maximum number
of days of detention valid for all situations was impossible to
determine.' 3 ' The exceptional situation in Northern Ireland,
the Court's case law, and the fact-based assessment of the
promptness of each release supported the dissent's view that
the detentions were consistent with article 5(3).132
D. Post-Brogan Modifications of the PTA
The U.K. Parliament amended the PTA in 1989.13 3 The
1989 version of the PTA is substantially the same as the 1984,
127. Id. at 33. The Court stated that
[t]he investigation of terrorist offences undoubtedly presents the authorities
with special problems .... The Court takes full judicial notice of the factors
adverted to by the Government in this connection .... The Court accepts
that, subject to the existence of adequate safeguards, the context of terror-
ism in Northern Ireland has the effect of prolonging the period during
which the authorities may, without violating Article 5 § 3, keep a person
suspected of serious terrorist offences in custody before bringing him
before a judge or other judicial officer.
Id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 39.
130. Id. The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Th6r Vilh jilmsson, Bind-
schedler-Robert, G61ciiklii, Matscher, and Valticos noted that "[t]he question is how
much latitude is allowable." Id.
131. Id. (citing St6gmfiller v. Australia, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1969)).
132. Id. at 40.
133. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, reprinted in
12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279 (4th ed. 1989).
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1976, and 1974 versions of the Act.' 34 The extrajudicial pow-
ers of detention embodied in the PTA have retained a "tempo-
rary" designation despite the requirement in the 1984 Act that
the legislation be made permanent or repealed after five
years.' 35 The PTA also retained annual parliamentary renewal
and annual commission investigations.
3 6
134. See id.; The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984,
PUBLIC GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1984 (pt. I), ch. 8; The Prevention of Terror-
ism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, PUBLIC GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1976
(pt. I), ch. 8; The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, PUBLIC
GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1974 (pt. II), ch. 56. The 1989 PTA contains the
powers of arrest and detention in section 14, the section addressing the arrest and
detention of suspected persons. This section provides that
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, a constable may arrest without war-
rant a person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be-
(a) a person guilty of an offence under section 2, 8, 9, 10 or 11
above;
(b) a person who is or has been concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which this section ap-
plies; or
(c) a person subject to an exclusion order.
(2) The acts of terrorism to which this section applies are-
(a) acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland;
and
(b) acts of terrorism of any other description except acts connected
solely with the affairs of the United Kingdom or any part other than
Northern Ireland.
(3) The power of arrest conferred by subsection (l)(c) above is exercis-
able only-
(a) in Great Britain if the exclusion order was made under section
5 above; and
(b) in Northern Ireland if it was made under section 6 above.
(4) Subject to subsection (5) below, a person arrested under this sec-
tion shall not be detained in right of the arrest for more than forty-eight
hours after his arrest.
(5) The Secretary of State may, in any particular case, extend the pe-
riod of forty-eight hours mentioned in subsection (4) above by a period or
periods specified by him, but any such further period or periods shall not
exceed five days in all and if an application for such an extension is made the
person detained shall as soon as practicable be given written notice of that
fact and of the time when the application was made.
(6) The exercise of the detention powers conferred by this section shall
be subject to supervision in accordance with Schedule 3 to this Act.
(7) The provisions of this section are without prejudice to any power of
arrest exercisable apart from this section.
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 14, reprinted in 12
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1294 (4th ed. 1989).
135. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, § 17(3),
PUBLIC GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1984 (pt. I), ch. 8, § 17(3), at 38.
136. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 27(5)-
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The United Kingdom has made two noteworthy altera-
tions to the 1989 version of the PTA.' 37 First, the U.K. Parlia-
ment adopted a formal system of reviews and authorization ap-
plicable to the detention provisions of section 14 of the
PTA.' 38 Second, the U.K. Parliament amended section 14(5)
(6), reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1303 (4th ed.
1989).
137. The two alterations appear in schedule 3 and section 14(5) respectively.
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, sched. 3 & § 14(5),
reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1311 & 1294 (4th
ed. 1989). For the text of schedule 3, see infra note 138. For the text of section
14(5), see supra note 134.
138. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, sched. 3,
reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1311 (4th ed. 1989).
This review process is modeled after the process contained in the Police and Crimi-
nal Evidence Act 1984. 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 12-13 (1989). These
processes are outlined in section 3 of schedule 3 of the PTA, titled "Supervision of
Detention and Examination Powers":
Detention for examination or detention of suspected persons:
3.-(l) Where a person is detained under section 14 of this Act or
under paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 to this Act his detention shall be periodi-
cally reviewed in accordance with this paragraph by a review officer and shall
not continue unless-
(a) that officer has authorised it to continue; or
(b) an application has been made to the Secretary of State for an
extension of the period of detention under subsection (5) of that sec-
tion or sub-paragraph (3) of that paragraph.
(2) The reviews shall be carried out as follows-
(a) the first review shall be as soon as practicable after the begin-
ning of the detention; and
(b) the subsequent reviews shall be at intervals of not more than
twelve hours; and no review shall be carried out after such an applica-
tion as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (l)(b) above has been made.
(3) Subject to sub-paragraph (4) below, on any such review the review
officer shall authorise the continued detention of the person in question if,
and only if, he is satisfied-
(a) that his continued 'detention is necessary in order to obtain
(whether by questioning him 6r otherwise) or to preserve evidence
which-
(i) relates to an offence under section 2, 8, 9, 10 or 11 of this
Act (in the case of detention under section 14) or under section 8
(in the case of detention under paragraph 6 of Schedule 5);
(ii) indicates that he is or has been concerned in the commis-
sion, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which sec-
tion 14 of this Act applies; or
(iii) indicates that he is subject to an exclusion order; and
(b) that the investigation in connection with which that person is
detained is being conducted diligently and expeditiously.
(4) The review officer may also authorise the continued detention of
the person in question-
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to require that written notice be given to detained individuals
if an application is submitted to the Secretary of State for an
extension of the original forty-eight hour detention period.139
This provision requires arresting authorities to give prompt
notification to the arrested individual of the reasons for arrest
and any charges levied.' 40
III. SEEKING A WORKABLE COMPROMISE TO THE
PROMPT APPEARANCE REQUIREMENT:
JUDICIAL REINTERPRETATION OF THE
PROMPT APPEARANCE
REQUIREMENT AND AN AMENDED PTA
The threat of terrorism and the unique demands it places
on a government's duty to protect its nationals has created in-
ternal pressure in the United Kingdom.' 4 ' The U.K. govern-
ment's primary concern is to achieve effective processes for the
detention of individuals who are perceived as risks to national
security.' 4 2 The U.K. government, however, may not ignore in
this pursuit the fundamental human rights of its subjects or its
obligations under the European Convention. 4 '
The Court's Brogan decision prompted the U.K. govern-
(a) pending consideration of the question whether he is subject to
an exclusion order;
(b) pending consideration by the Secretary of State whether to
make an exclusion order against him or to serve him with notice of a
decision to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, sched. 3, reprinted in
12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1311 (4th ed. 1989).
139. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 14(5),
reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1294 (4th ed. 1989).
The relevant addition to section 14(5) states that "if an application for such an exten-
sion is made the person detained shall as soon as practicable be given written notice
of that fact and of the time when the application was made." Id.
140. Id.
141. See 505 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 8 (1989).
142. See 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 973 (1989).
143. See supra notes 8-25 and accompanying text for contracting party obliga-
tions under the European Convention. The European Convention provisions repre-
sent the minimal human rights that must be protected by contracting states. Preven-
tion of Terrorism, supra note 38, at 759. Because the United Kingdom has no written
constitution, it should adopt the minimum panoply of human rights guarantees em-
bodied in the European Convention. Whitney, British Detention Law is Ruled a Breach of
Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1988, A19, col. 1. In order further to facilitate enforce-
ment of the European Convention's prompt appearance requirement, the U.K. Par-
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ment to submit again a notice of derogation applicable to
Northern Ireland on December 23, 1988.144 The U.K. govern-
ment's successive submissions of notices of derogation, which
effectively result in a form of permanent derogation, is untena-
ble for two reasons. First, article 15 presents derogation as a
temporary measure. 45  Accordingly, permanent derogation
conflicts with the human rights goals of the European Conven-
tion, and it is, therefore, likely that the Commission and the
Court will not accept a permanent notice of derogation. 46
liament should incorporate the European Convention provisions into U.K. statutory
domestic law.
The House of Lords discussed the impact of a lack of a written constitution in
the United Kingdom:
Of all the signatory states to the convention which have ratified, the United
Kingdom is the only state that has no written constitution and no adminis-
trative court in which misuse or abuse of power on the part of the Execu-
tive-the Secretary of State-may be reviewed.
As Members of the Committee will know, the Court of Human Rights
will not entertain jurisdiction unless and until all the vested procedures have
been exhausted. The reason this is part of a much bigger problem ... and
the reason there are so many cases before the European Court of Human
Rights to which the United Kingdom Government are responding is that
there is no administrative court to act as a sieve or a filter. Moreover, the
particular case in point, which gives rise to the decision in the amendment,
would have been caught in such a filter.
504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 970-71 (1989).
As the House of Lords noted, incorporation of the European Convention provi-
sions into the U.K. domestic law will also serve as a sieve to the Convention institu-
tions. Id. at 971. U.K. subjects alleging human rights violations would no longer be
constrained to appeal to the Convention institutions for protection of their most fun-
damental rights. See id.
144. 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 975 (1989); see supra note 63 (setting forth
prior notices of derogation by United Kingdom).
145. See European Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
Article 15 provides that "fijn the time of war or other public emergency threatening
the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from
its obligations under this convention .... It shall also inform the Secretary-General
of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate ..... Id. (emphasis
added). For the complete text of article 15 of the European Convention, see supra
note 46. Furthermore, it is accepted that article 15 of the European Convention "al-
lows only for partial, controlled, and temporary limitations." Schreuer, supra note
45, at 116.
146. See Finnie, The Prevention of Terrorism Act and The European Convention on
Human Rights, 52 MOD. L.R. 703, 709 (1989); Livingstone, A Week Is a Long Time in
Detention: Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 40 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q 288, 298-301
(1989). Several factors support a rejection of derogation as the appropriate response
to Brogan and suggest that the permanent nature of the Northern Ireland conflict
requires a permanent legislative solution. Initially, the state of affairs in Northern
Ireland is not temporary and normal conditions can never be restored. Boyle, supra
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Second, derogation provides tremendous propaganda value to
the terrorist organizations because it acknowledges the success
achieved by terrorist groups in undermining government con-
trol.' 4 7 The United Kingdom must eventually cease to dero-
gate from the European Convention, because its current notice
of derogation is not an adequate resolution to the issues
presented by the Brogan decision. 4 "
A. Judicial Reinterpretation of the Prompt Appearance Requirement
of Article 5(3) of the European Convention
The Brogan Court concluded that an extrajudicial deten-
tion period of four days, six hours is incompatible with the
prompt appearance requirement of article 5(3) of the Euro-
pean Convention.' 49 This determination appears inconsistent
note 46, at 175. Moreover, the duration of the conflict and the impact of the violence
have affected the whole of Northern Ireland to an extent that renders a return to
normalcy impossible in the near future. See id. Moreover, terrorism has been incor-
porated into the social fabric of Northern Ireland. Id.
This reality, while- disruptive, has not extinguished the very existence of organ-
ized life in the United Kingdom. Finnie, supra, at 709. Finnie suggests that "more
than assertion is required to prove that either the incidence or the nature of terror-
ism in the United Kingdom is such as to create an emergency threatening the life of
the nation of a kind which widespread 'non-political' violence does not." Id. Ulti-
mately, the United Kingdom must accept the existence of terrorist activities in North-
ern Ireland and introduce permanent legislation that effectively combats terrorism
while protecting the human rights of its subjects. See Boyle, supra note 46, at 175.
147. See 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 967 (1989). The prospect of extended
derogation was debated in the U.K. Parliament and criticized as an untenable re-
sponse to the Brogan decision. See id. Reliance on derogation was cited as having the
acute disadvantage of providing tremendous propaganda value to the terrorist orga-
nizations. See id. at 971. Moreover, derogation may be interpreted as an announce-
ment to the terrorist organizations that their operations have succeeded in under-
mining the democratic order of Great Britain. See id. at 967.
148. The U.K. Parliament had required that the 1984 PTA be replaced with per-
manent legislation in 1989. 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 16 (1989); The Prevention
of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, § 17(3), General Note, PUBLIC GEN-
ERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1984 (pt. I), ch. 8, § 17(3), at 38. The U.K. Parliament,
however, declined to make the 1989 PTA permanent because "it would be wrong, in
principle, to allow such exceptional powers to remain indefinitely on the statute
book." 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 16 (1989). The argument in support of per-
manent legislation accepts that there is no prospect of the terrorist threat subsiding
and, therefore, there is no point in regarding the extrajudicial detention powers as
temporary. Id. The more realistic approach for the U.K. Parliament is to accept the
existence of the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland and enact permanent legislation
that comports with Brogan.
149. Case of Brogan and Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), at 34. The
Court concluded that the four detention periods at issue in Brogan were incompatible
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with the Court's prior case law and with its analysis of the ef-
fects of terrorism on U.K. detention processes.' 50
Prior to Brogan, European Convention case law interpret-
ing the article 5(3) promptness requirement clearly permitted
a four-day extrajudicial detention period in ordinary criminal
offenses and a five-day extrajudicial detention period under ex-
traordinary circumstances.' 51 In fact, the Brogan Court empha-
sized the importance of background factors in assessing the
promptness of a judicial appearance and expressly acknowl-
edged that terrorism necessitates prolonged detention peri-
ods.' 52  Under such circumstances, the Court noted that a
prolonged detention period might not violate the prompt ap-
pearance requirement of article 5(3) of the European Conven-
tion. 1513 In light of the protracted conflict in Northern Ireland
involving terrorist activities, the Court should find that ex-
traordinary conditions exist, permitting a five-day extrajudicial
detention period in accordance with the prompt appearance
requirement of the European Convention. 154
with the prompt appearance requirement of article 5(3) of the European Convention.
Id.
150. Finnie, supra note 146, at 707-08. One commentator notes that
[the Court's decision] also introduces an undesirable element of uncertainty
by way of the importance it attaches to background factors . . . . It is sug-
gested that the Court's views are ambiguous in that it is not clear whether its
discussion of the notion of promptness is in abstract terms, thus setting
overall maximum limits to it, or whether it is discussing promptness only in
the context of the established features of the case in hand. On balance, the
former seems the more likely interpretation.
Id.
151. See supra note 32 (discussing case law interpreting prompt appearance re-
quirement).
152. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 33 (1988). The Court took judicial
notice of the terrorist-related difficulties of investigation in Northern Ireland. Id. It
further noted that the boundaries of prompt must "be assessed in each case accord-
ing to its special features." Id. at 32. The Court also accepted that terrorism caused
the need for prolonged detention periods, stating that "the context of terrorism in
Northern Ireland has the effect of prolonging the period during which the authorities
may, without violating Article 5 § 3, keep a person suspected of terrorist offenses in
custody before bringing him before a judge or other judicial officer." Id. at 33.
153. See id.
154. See Finnie, supra note 146, at 708-09. Finnie notes that the
United Kingdom press has seized upon four days as being the acceptable
limit, but nothing in the Court's judgment hints at this, and indeed the logic
of the decision suggests otherwise, although it does seem to suggest that the
background for the Prevention of Terrorism Act would permit an extension
of the normal criminal procedure limits.
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B. The PTA Must Be Amended to Satisfy the Prompt Appearance
Requirement of Article 5(3) of the European Convention
Were the Court to determine that a five-day detention pe-
riod is consistent with the European Convention requirements,
the United Kingdom must still alter its detention policies to
conform with the prompt appearance requirement of article
5(3) of the European Convention. t55 Specifically, the U.K.
government should shorten its maximum detention period to
five days instead of seven and introduce judicial review at this
point.
At present, the 1989 version of the PTA authorizes extra-
judicial detention periods of seven days, as did previous ver-
sions of the PTA.' 56 While the Brogan Court expressly rejected
Id.; see 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 57 (1988) (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.). The
Commission Report of May 14, 1987 provides persuasive support for an interpreta-
tion of the promptness requirement of article 5(3) that permits a five-day detention in
the case of extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 62-63. The Commission interpreted
the Court's prior case law to permit, in ordinary criminal offenses, a four-day deten-
tion period under article 5(3). Id. at 62. The Commission also accepted a five-day
detention period under article 5(3) in cases with exceptional circumstances. Id. The
Commission, however, refused to accept detentions beyond five days under any cir-
cumstances. Id. at 63. Furthermore, the Court's case law clearly rejects both six and
seven day detention periods under article 5(3). See supra note 32 (discussing prior
case law interpreting prompt appearance requirement of European Convention).
155. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing judicial reinter-
pretation of prompt appearance requirement of article 5(3) after Brogan decision).
156. Compare The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989,
§ 14(4)-(5), reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1294
(4th ed. 1989) with The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984,
§ 12(4)-(5), PUBLIC GENERAL ACTS & MEASURES OF 1984 (pt. I), ch. 8, § 12(4)-(5), at
34-35. For the text of section 14(4)-(5) of the 1989 Act, see supra note 134. For the
text of section 12(4)-(5) of the 1989 Act, see supra note 100.
The U.K. government considers the ability to detain for up to seven days integral
to its defense against terrorism. See Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 30 (1988).
The U.K. government argued in Brogan that
[i]n view of the nature and extent of the terrorist threat and the result-
ing problems in obtaining evidence sufficient to bring charges, the maxi-
mum statutory period of detention of seven days was an indispensable part
of the effort to combat that threat, as successive parliamentary debates and
reviews of the legislation ha[ve] confirmed.
Id. (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the House of Lords rejected an amendment reducing the statutory
maximum detention period to four days. 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 12 (1988).
One speaker noted that "we have considered and rejected one option-the possible
reduction of the maximum period of detention from seven days to four .... Lord
Colville sets out in great detail in his report the various reasons why seven days may
be needed in a small number of cases." Id. The government maintains that the
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a seven-day detention period as incompatible with the prompt
appearance requirement of the European Convention, that
Court and earlier cases indicate that five days might be accept-
able.' 57 Accordingly, the United Kingdom should amend the
PTA to provide for a five-day maximum extrajudicial detention
period.
The United Kingdom should not only shorten the deten-
tion period, it should also introduce judicial review. Section
14 of the 1989 PTA introduced certain internal checks on the
detention process but did not introduce judicial review.' 58
Furthermore, the requirement that written notice be given to
detained individuals if an application is submitted to the Secre-
tary of State for an extension of the original forty-eight hour
detention period does not conform with the prompt appear-
ance requirement of article 5(3) of the European Conven-
tion. 159
The United Kingdom advances several arguments against
judicial intervention. Initially, the United Kingdom argues
that the production of the sensitive evidence underlying the
government's application for extended detention would jeop-
seven day maximum period is needed to allow for the follow-up leads of the investi-
gation and the completion of forensic tests. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at
31 (1988). These forensic tests are extensive, time consuming, and increasingly im-
portant to successful prosecution of terrorists. See id. at 30-31; see also 504 PARL. DEB.
H.L. (5th ser.) 12 (1989). The government insists that four days is not sufficient time
for their completion. Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 31 (1988).
The U.K. Parliament also considered an amendment whereby the police consta-
ble would petition a justice of the peace, ex parte, for an extension of the detention
period. 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1367 (1989). The Parliament suspected that
the ex parte petition would not conform with the Brogan dictate and was, therefore,
critically viewed as a half-hearted attempt that had to be rejected. Id. at 968.
157. See supra note 32 (discussing Convention case law interpreting prompt ap-
pearance requirement of article 5(3)).
158. Dickson, The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, 40 N. IRE-
LAND LEGAL Q. 250, 257 (1989); see Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act, 1989, § 14, sched. 3, reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES
1279, 1311 (4th ed. 1989); supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text (discussing
modifications made to 1989 PTA).
159. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, § 14(5),
reprinted in 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND & WALES 1279, 1294 (4th ed. 1989).
The new notification requirement in section 14(5) is apparently designed to conform
with the notification requirement of article 5(2) of the European Convention. See
European Convention, supra note 2, art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226-28. For the text of
article 5(2) of the European Convention, see supra note 26.
358 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 13:328
ardize the investigation's success.1 60  Moreover, the United
Kingdom notes that judges would be brought into the political
controversy in Northern Ireland, thus undermining public con-
fidence of the impartiality of the Northern Ireland judiciary.1 6
Additionally, the introduction of judicial review would disrupt
the anti-terrorist procedures used in Northern Ireland.162 Fi-
nally, the United Kingdom asserts that judges lack specialized
knowledge concerning terrorist strategies and activities. 63 As
a result of the present structure, the executive branch has de-
veloped a particular expertise in terrorist cases; the extension
decisions made by the Secretary of State are, therefore, consis-
tent and well informed. 64
The statutory reduction of the maximum detention period
from seven to five days would not significantly increase the
likelihood that these risks will occur, because only those deten-
tions that require a period over five days will require judicial
authorization. The United Kingdom could further minimize
the effects of these risks by selecting one judge to preside over
160. See Case of Brogan and Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 31 (1988);
see also Memorial of the Government of the United Kingdom, the Case of Brogan and
Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (Nos. 10/1987/133/184-187), at 49-50
(1987).
161. Verbatim Record of the Public Hearings Held on May 25, 1988 (morning),
Case of Brogan and Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (Nos. 10/1987/133/
184-187), at 41.
162. See 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 974 (1989). A member of the House of
Lords summarized the problem:
[O]ur system of criminal justice is different from those in other European
countries which are parties to the convention. There is much talk about an
examining magistrate, but that is not a concept which we can import simply
into our system. In those countries where there is an examining magistrate,
he or she is part of the investigative system and operates in a way which is
radically different from the way in which our magistrates work.
Id.
163. Id. at 968, 972 (1989).
164. Id. at 973 (1989); see Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 31 (1988). The
Government argued that
[i]f entrusted with the power to grant extensions of detention, the judges
would be seen to be exercising an executive rather than a judicial function.
It would add nothing to the safeguards against abuse which the present ar-
rangements are designed to achieve and could lead to unanswerable criti-
cism of the judiciary. In all the circumstances, the Secretary of State was
better placed to take such decisions and to ensure a consistent approach.
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these hearings, who would then develop the needed expertise
this area requires.
Although the U.K. government has consistently argued
that a seven-day detention period is required in its anti-terror-
ism measures, it is arguable that in cases such as Brogan a more
organized and timely arrest could alleviate the need for a full
seven-day detention.'6 5 The U.K. government must devise a
method of more expedient evidence gathering in order to con-
form with a five-day maximum detention period. In those
cases where more than five days are required, the judiciary
must intervene to authorize the continued detention. Because
the government concedes that the full seven days is rarely uti-
lized, it is only these rare cases that will require judicial inter-
vention. 166
CONCLUSION
The importance of safeguarding human rights necessitates
165. See 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 68 (1988) (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.).
The partly dissenting opinion of Messrs. Frowein, Trechsel, Schermers, and Mrs.
Thune in the Brogan Commission decision suggested that the United Kingdom could
shorten the required detention period with more organized arrests. Id. This partly
dissenting opinion commented that
the following elements should also be taken into account, which indicate
that shorter periods [of detention] would have been sufficient in the present
cases: the applicants were not arrested during any kind of disturbance or
riot. The hour at which they were arrested and the fact that they were ar-
rested at their homes suggests that the arrests were planned in advance.
Id.
The U.K. goyernment countered this argument, stressing that the problem of
completion of forensic tests and the follow-up of leads would still be present in a
planned arrest. Verbatim Record of the Public Hearings Held on May 2, 1988
(morning), Case of Brogan and Others, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (Nos. 10/
1987/133/184-187), at 42. Typically, forensic tests take three days to perform. See
504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 12 (1989). A planned arrest and expedient forensic
testing, therefore, appears viable within five days. A speaker in the House of Lords
commented that
the opportunity to continue interrogations is not by itself the crucial factor.
The terrorist who remains silent for four days normally holds out for seven.
The main value of the extra time is rather that it allows for the following-up
of other leads and, in particular, for the completion of forensic tests. These
can be very extensive in terrorist cases and the test itself frequently takes at
least three days to do.
Id.
166. 504 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 12 (1989) (discussing Lord Colville's report
and need for seven day detentions in only a small number of cases); Livingstone,
supra note 146, at 296 n.34.
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a compromise in the United Kingdom's anti-terrorism strate-
gies. As with most compromises, no concerned party will be
completely satisfied. The United Kingdom cannot permit
human rights violations to continue unabated. The United
Kingdom has been cited twenty-one times for violation of the
European Convention and has responded with compatible re-
forms. It must conform again in order to preserve the integrity
of its status as a defender of human rights.
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